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Between 2010 and 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down two important decisions that expanded the rights of
corporations to engage in activities rooted in First Amendment
freedoms. Its decision in Citizens United1 held that, as an exercise of
free speech, corporations may make unlimited contributions to
support or oppose candidates in political elections. In the more recent
Hobby Lobby,2  the Court held that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act allows closely held corporations to opt out of certain
provisions of the Affordable Care Act in order to protect their rights
to the exercise of religion free from substantial government burden.3
Taken together, these two decisions extend the rights of for-profit
corporations to engage in fundamental freedoms traditionally
understood to belong only to individuals or groups of people such as
churches and political organizations. The extension of the protections
of these freedoms to for-profit corporations forces us to examine
* Associate Professor, Law Department, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College;
Director, Robert Zicklin Center for Corporate Integrity, Baruch College. The author is grateful
for feedback from participants in the Baruch College Department of Law's Faculty Scholarship
Series, the Weismann Center International Business Seminar Series, as well as The Roundtable
on Corporate Political Accountability: The Importance of Educating Future Business Leaders
Post-Citizens United (2013) (sponsored by the Center for Political Accountability). Thanks also
for comments from Michael Hadani. All errors are my own.
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43, 335 (2010).
2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2755 (2014).
3. Unlike Citizens United, Hobbr Lobby was not, strictly speaking, a First Amendment
case. Rather, the right to the exercise of religion at issue arose from an act of Congress, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). HobbiLobb, 134 S.Ct. at 2759. It is fair to say
though that it has roots in the First Amendment because RFRA was passed in response to a
Supreme Court decision, Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that many
Americans believed misinterpreted the scope of the Free Exercise Clause.
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more closely the ways that corporate leaders decide to exercise these
rights and to understand better how the law governs the rights of
other stakeholders who are affected by their decisions.4
The decision in Citizens United permits corporations to provide
unlimited funding to organizations that are purportedly independent
of the candidates themselves. This change in law quickly gave rise to
the "super PACs" that were so prominent in the 2012 presidential
campaign and other election contests.5 Now that corporate political
speech is understood to be constitutionally protected, regulation of
such speech must come from the body of law that controls how
companies decide to speak in the first place: corporate governance.6
Subject to the law of the state of incorporation,' corporations are a
complex set of relationships among shareholders, managers and a
board of directors. 8 The specific rules of these relationships arise from
the articles of incorporation of each business as well as the default
4. Hobbi Lobby applies only to closely held corporations and its holding will, in the
meantime, have little effect on the way large publicly held corporations do business. However,
the majority opinion in that case specifically addresses the question of what it means for a
corporation with many disconnected shareholders to practice religion in the first place. Hobbi
Lobb, 134 S.Ct. at 2768-70. The court's skepticism regarding this prospect sheds important
light on the way it views corporate political spending. See infra notes 22 and accompanying text.
5. Super PACs are political action committees that may raise unlimited amounts of money
from corporations and other donors for use in their own independent campaign advertising. The
super PACs have wide discretion in using their funds but may not donate directly to a
candidate's campaign treasury. Unlike with some other expenditures, neither campaign finance
law nor state corporate law obligate corporate leaders to disclose to shareholders, to the public,
or to regulators the details of much of their political spending. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, CORPORATE CAMPAIGN SPENDING: GIVING SHAREHOLDERS
A VOICE 9-13 (2010). A variety of other kinds of political organizations exist to which
corporations may also make unlimited donations with varying degrees of secrecy and tax-related
consequences. However, this article will focus on the decision making that goes into a corporate
donation to a super PAC.
6. See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2011).
7. Delaware has long been the most popular state for incorporation of large publicly held
corporations; further, for legal scholars, its courts have provided much of the most insightful
analysis and discourse on corporate governance.
8. Increasingly, some legal scholars would add other "stakeholders" (employees,
customers, communities) to the mix of parties who have or are owed duties by shareholders,
directors and corporations themselves. Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic
Mlodel of Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251-52 (2002). For a provocative
discussion of the subject, see Virginia Harper Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value: Corporate
Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 71-72 (2010). In
the meantime, however, corporate law still focuses almost exclusively on the duties owed by and
to shareholders, managers and directors.
Vol. 11:1
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING
rules under state corporate law. For the purposes of this article, the
most important aspect of that law is the fiduciary duties imposed on
the directors and managers of the corporation. If these duties are
breached, shareholders may sue to enforce them through a
shareholder derivative lawsuit -subject, of course, to the severe
limitations on such lawsuits provided by the business judgment rule.
The business judgment rule allows corporate directors extremely
broad discretion to make decisions on behalf of the corporation
without fear of personal liability even when those decisions result in
losses. Courts have justified the rule on the grounds that, although it
allows corporations to frequently fall short of "best practices," it
maximizes profits for shareholders by allowing business leaders to
take the kinds of risks that lead to new ideas and innovations.9 The
rule plainly protects the rights of directors to engage in charitable
giving 0  and other conduct motivated by "corporate social
responsibility""1 (hereinafter "CSR") for two main reasons. First,
such action is often perceived as designed to promote profitability in
the long run. More importantly, allowing courts to second-guess such
action would result in excessive judicial intrusion into corporate
decision-making and reduce the kind of risk-taking that results in
long-term profits.-
When a corporation makes contributions to political campaigns,
it often does so because it believes that such donations directly
increase profits by influencing the way the government regulates the
company's business. These kinds of decisions to engage in corporate
political spending are likely to survive any judicial review. But some
political outlays might not carry with them an obvious intention to
9. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (2007). For a discussion of
the jurisprudence of risk and the business judgment rule, see David Rosenberg, Suppliing the
Adverb: The Future of Corporate Risk-Taking and the Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY
Bus. L. J. 216 (2009).
10. Corporate law statutes in many states explicitly allow this as well. See, e.g., 8 DEL.
CODE ANN. § 229 (2000).
11. Defining "corporate social responsibility" is a tricky proposition. It means something
like a decision by a corporation that benefits stakeholders other than the shareholders and
arises from no obvious profit-maximizing motive.
12. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. 1968); Gagliardi v. Trifood Int'l,
683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1997). See also Finer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in
the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733,776-83 (2005).
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influence regulation. Rather, they might appear to be more like the
kind of charitable giving (perhaps justified as "community outreach"
or "goodwill") that receives business judgment rule protection
although it does not have a clear relationship to creation of profit.
Finally, some donations might be neither of these; rather, they might
be designed to enhance the interests of the decision-makers
themselves or the managerial class to which they belong.
1 3
Of course, the business judgment rule allows corporate leaders to
make decisions on behalf of the corporation even when those
decisions provide no obvious intended benefit to the company's
bottom line and indeed even when those decisions turn out to hurt
the corporation in the long run. Under current law, this broad
discretion applies to campaign spending as much as to any other
decision to pursue risky business opportunities, spend corporate
funds, or to associate the corporation's name with a political or
community cause. Further, corporate law provides no requirement
that corporations disclose information to the shareholders regarding
the company's participation in political activity. 14 Nor do shareholders
have the right to vote on the specific question of how the corporation
spends dollars in the political arena."
Where political spending does not violate a duty owed to the
shareholders, shielding directors from liability is plainly appropriate.
1 6
Indeed, many early responses to Citizens 1nited take it for granted
13. TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 5, at 9 (citing Lance F. Lindblom, The Price of Politics,
PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, Oct. 1, 2004). As Torres-Spelliscy indicates, Lindblom
distinguishes nicely between what is currently legitimate corporate political spending
("support[ing] the industry business model") and what most agree crosses the line ("simply
back[ing] personal or managerial interests").
14. Id. at 10.
15. As this article demonstrates, American corporate law takes a decidedly hands-off
approach to corporate political spending. Id. In contrast, British law, among other jurisdictions,
now contains both disclosure requirements for large donations and shareholder consent for
political donation resolutions. Id. at 16.
16. We will leave for another day a discussion of the morality and ethics of corporations
influencing elections in order to help write the laws that will regulate the corporations
themselves. Jill Fisch addresses the question in The Bad Mlan Goes to ltashington: The Effect
of Political Influence on Corporate DuI, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1610 (2006). Fisch cites
Robert Reich's belief that "corporations have a social responsibility to refrain from politics,"
because they are amoral entities in the first place constrained only by laws that they are
compelled to follow. Id. (citing Robert B. Reich, The Mleaning of Corporate Social
Responsibiliti, 40 CAL. MGMT. 8, 10 (1998)).
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that, under existing law, the broad protections offered by the business
judgment rule preclude the possibility of limiting the decision's
damage unless lawmakers pass legislation that provide "special rules
to govern who may make political speech decisions on behalf of
corporations." 7 This article will argue, however, that such lawmaking
is not necessary because the business judgment rule should not be
interpreted to protect corporate directors' decisions to donate to
political campaigns in the same way that it protects ordinary
corporate charitable contributions or decisions based on CSR. The
rule protects donations in the public interest even if they are profit-
sacrificing because courts are not in a position to judge whether or
not a particular act of giving is designed to maximize profits or is
simply an acceptable act of charity with no obvious financial benefit
to the corporation itself.18 We ought to tolerate the latter both
because we do not want courts evaluating a corporation's strategy to
create goodwill in the community and because we have no reason to
discourage true acts of altruism by American businesses. An act of
political giving, however, seems to be based on only two possible
motivations, one of which we should not tolerate. First, it might have
a pure business purpose by helping to elect politicians whose policies
will be favorable to the corporation. Second, it might reflect the self-
interest of the corporate directors and officers. This self-interest
might take the form of supporting certain politicians because they
reflect the decision-makers' own views or because the decision-
makers stand to gain from the politicians' policies. Alternatively, the
self-interest might arise from the director or manager's hope of
receiving a personal benefit in a quid pro quo for their support.1 9
17. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83,84 (2010). The authors insist at the outset that "political speech
decisions are substantially different from and should not be subject to the same rules as ordinary
business decisions." Id.
18. Elhauge, supra note 12, at 739.
19. As Jackson and Bebchuk wrote, "Political spending might often have consequences that
are exogenous to the firm's performance and directors' and executives' preferences with respect
to such spending might be influenced by these consequences." Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note
17, at 90. They propose changes to corporate law to allow shareholders to pass binding
resolutions on political spending, among other things. Id. at 100. My solution differs markedly
from theirs however because I propose that existing corporate law, if applied correctly, should
be sufficient to combat this kind of self-interested behavior.
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Political donations do not seem to fit into a third category of pure
philanthropy so often used to justify judicial resistance to reviewing
charitable giving by corporations 0°
Plainly self-interested acts of corporate political spending
constitute disloyalty under existing law. Since much corporate
political giving fits into this category, courts ought to be willing to
review such activity and recognize it as falling outside the protections
of the business judgment rule. Such scrutiny will produce two
important benefits. It will prevent corporate leaders from exploiting
their freedoms under Citizens United to enrich themselves or
promote their own personal points of view at the shareholders'
expense. Further, it will remove legal acts of corporate political
spending from the category of goodwill and charity in the public eye
and focus more attention on their true purpose-for businesses to use
their vast monetary resources to influence legislation and regulation
in their own interests and against the public good.
II. INTERNAL DISTORTION: THE AGENCY PROBLEMS
PRESENTED BY CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING
Increased corporate giving to super PACS presents a variety of
problems in both American political and corporate life. As Larry
Ribstein emphasized, an understanding of the implications of Citizens
United requires that we distinguish between the "external distortion"
and "internal distortion" brought about by corporate political
spending. 1 The former refers to the effects that the increased
influence of corporations has had on public debate and the outcome
of elections. While external distortion has plainly had an important
role in recent political campaigns, the decision in Citizens United has
settled the issue -corporations have a First Amendment right to pay
for speech in the political arena. As such, responding to the effects of
external distortion is a question of constitutional law, voting rights,
and campaign finance regulation. Internal distortion refers to the
extent to which a corporation's spending presents agency problems
20. See infra notes 35, 54 and accompanying text.
21. Ribstein, supra note 6, at 1024 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466).
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within the corporation itself; for example, by allowing directors and
managers to give money in ways that do not necessarily reflect the
views of the shareholders themselves or that call into question their
adherence to their fiduciary duties to the shareholders. Much of the
discussion of internal distortion in the wake of Citizens United has
focused on the ruling's implications for the expressive rights of the
shareholders. -, This paper will focus instead on the disjunction that
arises when corporate leaders spend shareholder's money on political
causes in ways that might violate their fundamental fiduciary duties to
the corporation. It will argue that a proper interpretation of current
fiduciary law ought to call into question the legitimacy of much
corporate political spending because it fallsg outside the bounds of
the protection of the business judgment rule. Further, the consequent
narrowing of the kinds of political spending that corporations can
engage in will draw greater public attention to corporate political
spending that benefits the business itself but harms other
stakeholders. This will result in a greater public focus on proper
corporate political spending and its consequences and allow
shareholders, consumers, and others to make decisions with fuller
knowledge about the nature of the companies in which they invest or
with whom they do business.
A. Is CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING DIFFERENT FROM OTHER
DECISIONS/EXPENDITURES?
Many kinds of corporate political contributions are not, in
principal, necessarily different from other profit-motivated actions
that shareholders disapprove of.2' For example, a corporation might
22. See, e.., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 17, and Anne Tucker, Flaif ed Assumptions: A
Corporate Law Analisis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61
CASE W. RES. L REv. 497, 498-99 (2010). Another line of scholarship has focused on the
relationship between political spending and firm value. See, e.-., John C. Coates IV, Corporate
Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMP. LEGAL. STUDIES
657, 658-64 (2012). Such studies are certainly useful from the point of view of management and
strategy, but they do not seem to have as much to say about the fiduciary duties of corporate
leaders because, as discussed below, corporate law does not demand that they always pursue the
most profitable course or even the course that they believe to be the most profitable. See infra
notes 37, 45, 58, 81 and accompanying text.
23. David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate La: Corporate Social
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follow a legal but environmentally harmful procedure because doing
so seems to maximize profit. 24 Some shareholders may well
disapprove of such action (even though its intent is profit-
maximizing25) because they care more about preventing damage to
the environment than they care about dividends or the trading price
of their shares. The harm to shareholders is plain: as citizens, their
environment (along with everyone else's) is damaged and, as
shareholders, they are associated with environmental destruction
through their ownership of stock in that corporation. 6Aggrieved
shareholders have a few, largely ineffectual, remedies)27 They might
attempt to elect directors who will take environmental questions into
account when formulating corporate policy or they might pursue
Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1197, 1228 (2011). Indeed, the Supreme
Court itself recognized this in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, pointing out that the
appellant had failed to distinguish between political expenditures and other "controversial
corporate decisions ... made by management." 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978). Roger Coffin
nicely frames the issues that inevitably arise from this: "Shareholder-directed reformers
essentially posit the question- is corporate support of a federal candidate for office enough of a
deviation from the corporate function to justify a change in the basic allocation of power
between boards and shareholders itself?" Roger Coffin, A Responsibiliti to Speak: Citizens
United, Corporate Governance and~anay'ng Risks, 8 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 103, 129 (2012).
24. A more environmentally friendly alternative procedure might create positive PR that is
nonetheless outweighed by its added expense.
25. There is no doubt that polluting is often good for the bottom line for obvious reasons.
Many advocates of CSR argue that corporations should "go green" because to do so maximizes
long term profits, for example, by ensuring the continuing existence of the natural resources
required to make certain products. While CSR advocates are certainly correct in many
instances, these arguments belong to the study of management and strategy and not corporate
governance.
26. As Einer Elhauge points out, this problem is much less severe in corporations than in
partnerships or sole proprietorships because corporate shareholders are less easily identified
with a business's conduct than are partners or sole proprietors. Elhauge, supra note 12, at 758.
Other commentators have noted that corporate shareholders themselves likely "do not identify
with the speech of the corporations they invest in." Ribstein, supra note 6, at 1029. Ribstein goes
on to say that the dissent in Citizens Ulnitednotes that "corporate speech is often the expression
of the firm's executives or directors who actually decide what the corporation says." Id. The
Supreme Court decision in Hobby Lobby suggests that future courts will distinguish between
closely held and publicly held corporations regarding the extent to which expressive activity is
associated with the individual shareholders themselves. Hobb-iLobb/n 134 S.Ct. at 2774.
27. Reza Dibadj puts it this way: "As corporate lawyers recognize, shareholders can only do
three things to protect themselves: sell, vote, and sue." Reza Dibadj, Citizens United as
Corporate Law Narrative, 16 NEXuS: CHAP. J. L. & POL'Y 39, 49 (2011) (citing Robert B.
Thompson, Dela if are, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the First State as First
in Corporate La if- 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779, 781 (2004)). My article largely addresses the third of




some kind of proxy-based collective shareholder action provided for
in the by-laws of the corporation)28 Alternatively, in their capacities as
private citizens, they might advocate for the election of government
officials29 who will pass stricter environmental laws that would make
the corporation's behavior more expensive or illegal.30 Or, they can
sell their shares.
When a corporation chooses to contribute to a super PAC that
promotes views that a certain shareholder personally disagrees with,
the effects are similar to when a corporation takes other kinds of
actions that the shareholder opposes although they are intended to
(and likely in fact do) benefit the corporation and the shareholder's
financial interests.3 For example, a corporation might donate to a
super PAC that supports a candidate who opposes environmental
regulations that are adverse to the corporation's immediate or long-
term interests. Alternatively, a corporation might donate to a super
PAC that is largely disconnected from the interests of the corporation
but which the directors and managers want to support in order to
create "goodwill" for the corporation in the community. 3" In either
28. The Citizens United decision depends in many ways on the factual accuracy of Justice
Kennedy's assertion that "There is, furthermore, little evidence of abuse that cannot be
corrected by shareholders 'through the procedures of corporate democracy."' Citizens United,
588 U.S. at 361 (citing Bellotti 435 U.S. at 794 (2010)). Many of the most strident criticisms of
the decision in Citizens United argue that the majority opinion mischaracterizes the ability of
shareholders to influence corporate policy through exercise of their voting rights. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens asserts, "In practice, however, these rights are so limited as to be almost
nonexistent." 130 S.Ct. at 978. See also Paul S. Miller, Shareholder Rights: Citizens United and
Delaware Corporate Governance Lawr, 28 J.L. & POL. 51, 53 (2012). Roger Coffin counters that
Stevens' dissenting view is "paternalistic" and that it does not acknowledge "a governance
landscape that has changed, and is no longer tilted in favor of management and the board of
directors." Coffin, supra note 23, at 126.
29. A pure law and economics argument might go this way: the welfare of shareholders is
maximized by allowing the corporation to seek profits through any legal means however
destructive to the collective it might be. By doing so, the stock's value will be maximized and
shareholders can use their increased wealth to donate to the campaigns of politicians who will
pass laws making that same destructive activity illegal. See Coffin, supra note 23, at 158 ("If a
shareholder is conflicted by political speech, they are free to take the money they make from
the stock and start a PAC in opposition to the cause").
30. When corporate directors authorize action that is illegal, shareholders have a remedy
under law: a shareholder derivative lawsuit. Shareholders will win in such actions even if the
directors can show that the illegal action was in fact profit-motivated. See David Rosenberg,
Delawifare s 'Expanding Duty of L ovalty'andlllegal Conduct. A Step Toiards Corporate Social
Responsibiliti. 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 81, 87 (2012).
31. See Yosifon, supra note 23.
32. See Elhauge, supra note 12, at 777. As I will discuss below, under the business judgment
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case, not only is the shareholder associated with opinions with which
he might disagree, but he is also indirectly paying for the propagation
of those opinions. Whether this implicates the shareholders' First
Amendment rights is an open question.33 As with other kinds of
unsavory behavior taken by a corporation, the shareholder's remedies
are weak: use her voting rights to change corporate policy (Fat
chance!), sell her shares, or use her own personal funds to finance
political speech in opposition to the corporation's position.
In all of these examples, the directors at least have acted in a way
that promotes the interests of the corporation,34 although the
shareholders might not approve of them in their capacities as
stakeholders in the corporation or as citizens. However, directors
might also make decisions to spend corporate funds on political
speech that are based on self-interest and not the interests of the
corporation. 3 For example, they might give corporate money to a
super PAC that supports candidates whose views the directors
personally agree with although the corporation would appear to gain
nothing from such a contribution. Worse, a corporation might give to
a super PAC that supports candidates who oppose limits on executive
compensation or because the directors believe that they (and their
rule, corporations are empowered to spend money promoting goodwill in the community.
Whether political spending constitutes goodwill is the crucial question.
33. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 17, at 114. Larry Ribstein, a strict contractarian believes
that the shareholders' First Amendment rights are not violated by corporate speech with which
they disagree. Ribstein, supra note 6, at 1029-30. It is hard to disagree with the argument thatthis is not a free speech issue for two reasons: (1) The governmentis not controlling speech; and
(2) If shareholders don't like the speech they are subsidizing, they can sell their shares.
34. Or in a way that at the very least has a "nexus" to the business of the corporation. See
Coffin, supra note 23, at 125. The rule that allows apparently corporate sacrificing behavior as
long as it has a nexus to the corporation's interests is hazy because it is so difficult to define
what we mean by "nexus." Elhauge, supra note 12, at 772. This is specially true in a world in
which corporate charters state the business purpose of the company as broadly as possible in
order to avoid claims that certain activities are ultra vires. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 59-60 (Found. Press 2002).
35. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora 's Box" Alanagerial Discretion and the Problem of
Corporate Philanthropi, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 609 (1997) ("Because traditional mechanisms
of accountability are absent in this area, corporate philanthropy represents an area of corporate
conduct in which managerial self-interest may flourish."); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 17, at
90 ("The basic problem arises from the fact that political spending decisions may be a product
not merely of a business judgment regarding the firm's strategy, but also of the directors' and
executives' own political preferences and beliefs."). In addition to using corporate funds to
promote their own political agendas, managers can do something far worse: use the funds to
elicit personal benefits (an ambassadorship to Tahiti?) from the politicians they help to elect.
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friends) will personally benefit from such spending.36 Worse still, the
directors might send corporate dollars to certain causes because they
believe that such donations will generate personal goodwill for
themselves by, for example, ultimately leading to a political
appointment or favorable treatment from a government agency in a
private matter. As discussed below, corporate law makes it difficult to
distinguish between political spending motivated by a desire to
benefit the corporation and political spending motivated by self-
interest. The law must recognize the difference not only because good
corporate governance demands it, but also because it will effectively
combat some of the potential ill effects of the decision in Citizens
I Tnited.
III. HOW THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE PROTECTS
ALTRUISTIC ACTIONS BY CORPORATIONS
While American corporate law has a long history of describing
corporations as entities motivated solely by profit,37 it has nonetheless
traditionally allowed directors to make decisions motivated by
altruism or even philanthropy. This permissiveness arises not so much
because the makers of corporate law want corporations to be
charitable institutions but because they believe that profit is
maximized when courts refrain from reviewing the decisions of
corporate directors even when those decisions appear to be motivated
by something other than the bottom line.38 The hands-off approach is
embodied in the business judgment rule, which holds that
shareholders cannot sue directors for breach of duty unless they can
show that the directors did not "act[] on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
36. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 17, at 89.
37. See Dodge v. Ford, 204 Mich. 495, 495 (1919). This case, a favorite of corporate law
professors for years, may be falling out of fashion. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, !17hi We Should
Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW, 1-11 (Jonathan R.
Macey ed., 2008). Professor Stout makes a compelling argument that Dodge v. Fordshould not
stand for the proposition that corporations exist only for the purpose of maximizing value for
the shareholders. Nonetheless, its language continues to be cited for just that idea: "A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders." Dodge, 204
Mich. at 507.
38. Elhauge, supra note 12, at 776.
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interests of the company., 39 This rule has protected directors from
liability for almost any decisions that can be justified as motivated by
the desire to create goodwill in the community, to engage in CSR, or
to express opinions in the political arena, including situations in which
there is no obvious or even indirect financial benefit resulting from
the action.
The precedent that most influenced the substantial breadth of
the business judgment rule's protection is the beloved case of
Shlensky v. Wrigley/° (the Wrigley family of baseball and chewing
gum fame). It involved the refusal by the principal owner of the
Chicago Cubs baseball team to install lights at the team's stadium,
Wrigley Field, which would have allowed the team to play night
games. At the time of the decision, every other Major League
baseball team had begun to play night games. Minority shareholders
had been clamoring for the installation of lights because they believed
that it would substantially increase the team's revenue. They sued,
arguing that the owner was ignoring his obligation to maximize
profits. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim, stating that, under
the business judgment rule, absent fraud, illegality, or self-interest, it
would not second-guess a business decision even if it did not appear
to be the wisest decision.41 The court noted that there were, after all,
numerous possible legitimate business purposes for maintaining a
day-game-only policy (e.g., the effect it might have on the goodwill of
the residents of the neighborhood who were concerned about noise
and traffic during evening hours). Importantly, however, the court
was unwilling to evaluate whether Wrigley was wise or correct in
pursuing these outcomes. Rather, the court said that judging such a
decision is "beyond our jurisdiction and ability." 4' Since Wrigley's
decision to forego night games was not fraudulent, illegal, or self-
interested, the court refused to review it. In the wake of Wrigley and
cases that followed it, corporate directors have enjoyed broad
discretion to make decisions that take into account the place of the
corporation in the community even if such decisions do not appear to
39. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
40. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
41. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, at 123.
42. H'ri1ee, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
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be motivated by profit maximization in the short or long term.
The reasoning in Wrigley is all that is needed to justify virtually
any decision based on CSR. Corporate directors can almost always
defend a decision to, for example, continue to locate a factory in an
Indiana town even though it would seem to be more profitable to
move the operation abroad. Further, Wrigleywould protect managers
from liability for a decision to donate to a charity or provide free
goods and services to a community group. Such decisions are
unreviewable by courts because these actions are designed to result in
goodwill and positive public relations. They can be viewed, like a
decision to advertise, as based on a rational expectation that they will
result in greater profits for the corporation in the long run.
But the business judgment rule in the wake of Wrigley allows
even more discretion than that. The rule does not require that
decisions be intended to result in greater profit; it requires only that
decisions be based on a motivation other than fraud, illegality, or self-
interest. The rule, therefore justifies a decision to engage in an
activity apparently related to CSR or pure altruism even if the
directors believe that it ought not to bring monetary benefits.
Allowing such actions, however, does not necessarily mean that the
business judgment rule ignores the primacy of profit. As Einer
Elhauge has written, "This is the rule because the economic
efficiencies that come from delegating the management of the
business to someone other than shareholders or judges cannot be
achieved without creating such discretion."4 3 The business judgment
rule, he says, "effectively eliminates any enforceable duty to profit-
maximize and leaves managers with de facto discretion to sacrifice a
reasonable degree of corporate profits to further public interest
objectives." 44 But it also leaves them that discretion to sacrifice profits
to further goals that might appear to be public interest objectives but
are really self-interest (like donating to a super PAC in order to gain
a personal benefit for one of the directors). 4 Indeed, it is not clear if
43. Elhauge, supra note 12, at 776.
44. Id. at 777.
45. As Elhauge notes, "Managers achieve the level of profits necessary to avoid
interference with their discretion but otherwise run the firm to advance other aims." Id. at 804.
Those other aims might well be the directors' own self-interest.
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Elhauge views donations to political causes as part of the "public
interest" that he so often invokes as the beneficiary of corporate
giving. The result of the breadth of the business judgment rule's
protection is that "a strained claim that the activity somehow
increases corporate profits (by building goodwill with clients or the
community) will allow the conduct to survive legal scrutiny. " 46
According to Elhauge, from the shareholders' point of view, a cure
for this problem would be worse than the disease because such a cure
would end business judgment deference and eliminate the kind of
risk-taking that results in greater long-term profits. 47 The business
judgment rule seems to protect almost all corporate political
spending, not in order to encourage such activity, but because
allowing courts to review it would require excessive judicial
monitoring. This would in turn ultimately lower corporate profits.
Courts have long emphasized the importance of allowing
directors to take risks as a justification for a broad interpretation of
the business judgment rule. Common sense (and economic history)
tells us that a company will not succeed if it takes no risks whatsoever.
Courts seem to hold as almost sacred the idea that directors should be
motivated to take risks to benefit the corporation, free from the fear
that they will be held personally liable if the results of their decisions
do not in fact benefit the company and its shareholders. 48 The owner
of shares in any corporation will likely agree that she wants the
directors and managers to take risks and that they ought not to be
held responsible every time such a risk results in losses. But advocates
of a broad business judgment rule take it further. They argue that
since most investors own shares in more than one corporation, these
shareholders should want business leaders to pursue riskier courses of
action because, across a diverse portfolio of holdings, the investor's
profit will be maximized by more risk-taking rather than less.49 Courts
46. Elhauge, supra note 12, at 804. This article argues that much corporate political
spending relies on just that kind of strained claim: it can be argued that just about any corporate
political donation (no matter how transparently self-interested) might result in goodwill and
possibly greater long-term profits and therefore deserves business judgment rule protection.
47. Elhauge, supra note 12, at 810-11.
48. Inre git Disnev Co., 907 A.2d at 698.
49. For a criticism of this view, see David Rosenberg, Suppluiing the Adverb: The Future of
Corporate Risk-Takibg and the Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 216, 222-23
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and commentators alike often rely on investors' ability to diversify as
a key justification for the business judgment rule's breadth.50
Directors typically justify decisions to engage in political
spending using the reasoning of Wrigley, which, according to one
commentator, "provides broad latitude for corporate political
activity."" Much of the time, of course, political donations are indeed
motivated by profit-maximization. A director might sincerely argue
that he voted to donate tens of thousands of dollars to a particular
super PAC because its agenda, if successfully implemented, could
save the corporation millions. But even if no such obvious motivation
is present, the directors will likely be protected by the business
judgment rule because they could argue that the donation, like
Wrigley's decision to forego night games, "showed no fraud, illegality
or conflict of interest in their making of that decision."- Recognizing
when a conflict of interest arises in the context of corporate political
giving is, of course, notoriously difficult.
IV. WHY A BROAD READING OF THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE IS INADEQUATE TO PROTECT THE
INTERESTS OF SHAREHOLDERS WHEN CORPORATIONS
MAKE POLITICAL DONATIONS
If we ignore, for the moment, political giving clearly motivated
by a desire to bring about legislation and policies favorable to a
corporation's bottom line, there appears to be a great deal of political
spending that ought not to receive the protection of the business
judgment rule. Undoubtedly, directors sometimes decide to pass
corporate funds on to political organizations in order to benefit
(2009).
50. See, e.-., Gagliardi v. Trifood Int'l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1997),
("[s]hareholders' investment interests, across the full range of their diversifiable equity
investments, will be maximized if corporate directors and managers honestly assess risk and
reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are above
the firm's cost of capital"). See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, at 107.
51. Larry Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109, 126 (1992).
Although that article was written well before Citizens United, its application of the business
judgment rule to corporate political spending is still useful.
52. Wriegle, 237 N.E.2d at 781.
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themselves rather than the corporation. 3 But, absent a palpable quid
pro quo, the nature of the self-interest might be hidden in a way that
ordinary disloyalty is not. For example, a corporate director might
decide to donate to a super PAC that supports candidates who,
among other things, oppose changes in corporate law that would limit
executive compensation or that would increase shareholder rights.
But it seems extremely unlikely, using the Wrigley standard, that a
shareholder could hold the director liable for this misdirection of
corporate funds even though it was not designed to benefit the
corporation and did not have any kind of nexus to the corporation's
purpose.5 4 Even if the donation could not easily be justified as an
attempt to generate goodwill, it would still not be reviewed absent a
showing of fraud, self-interest, or illegality. Indeed, one study of the
existing case law, by Thomas W. Joo (published nearly ten years
before Citizens U7nitedo , found that courts are as deferential to
managerial decisions regarding corporate political spending as they
are to more ordinary business decisions.5 The most prominent case
cited in the study, Marsili v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., held that the
business judgment rule would protect managers from review of any
political spending decision that could be "construed as incidental or
expedient for the attainment of corporate purposes.,
S6
As Joo usefully observes, a shareholder lawsuit that objects to a
53. Of course, this kind of self-interested behavior also takes places when directors make
ordinary business decisions. For example, a director might vote to award a contract to a certain
company, not because he believes that company is providing the best deal, but because he
believes that he will receive some future benefit arising from his vote, such as being nominated
as a director of that corporation in the future. When this happens, shareholders ought to be able
to recover from the director for breach of the duty of loyalty if they can demonstrate the conflict
of interest and the unfairness of the deal. Because decisions regarding political giving are not
easily subjected to a fairness analysis, the situations are not entirely analogous in practice.
Indeed, at least one commentator has noted the utter impracticality of attempting to subject
corporate political contributions to the fairness test. James Kwak, Corporate Law Constraints
on Political Spending, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 251, 281 (2013). Further, as Reza Dibadj points
out, many states, including Delaware, employ a very loose standard when evaluating claims for
unfairness. Dibadj, supra note 27, at 50.
54. Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1191,
1200 (20(P) (".... such reciprocity is too ephemeral to be feasibly identified in court as
improperly 'purchased' for the manager by the corporate gift.").
55. Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating
Corporate Governance Analisis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 70-
72 (2001).
56. Id. at 71.
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political spending decision is not really objecting to the wisdom of the
action but rather "raises the question of whether election-related
spending is a business-related decision at all.""7 Indeed, absent
evidence of fraud, disloyalty, or illegality, under the existing
interpretation of the business judgment rule, shareholders could
never call into question any such decisions because there is always a
plausible argument (or "strained claimed" as Elhauge might call it)
that the spending was "incidental or expedient" or had a "nexus" to
corporate purposes. But the specter of disloyalty or illegality will
always hang over every act of election spending that does not have a
clear link to the profit motive; why would a manager thrust his
company (its funds and its reputation) into the gutter of American
politics if he didn't expect it to benefit himself (disloyalty!) or if he
didn't expect to get something in return (illegality!)'?
The business judgment rule is designed to maximize corporate
profits,s8 not to maximize corporate free speech or engagement with
the community. It allows those activities without subjecting them to
judicial review because allowing such review would, in the long run,
result in lower profits for the corporation and its shareholders. But
the business judgment rule need not be as broad as that to achieve
this goal. As discussed above, the rule allows just about any decision
based on goodwill or CSR because to review such decisions would
harm long-term profits and because they rarely can be attributed to a
disloyal motive.
It is important to consider here the evolution of fiduciary duties
under Delaware law in recent years and what some commentators
have termed "the expanding duty of loyalty." s9 Traditionally, the
fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers included care,
loyalty, and good faith under Delaware law. However, in the wake of
both a game changing decision that seemed to enhance the duty of
care to an impractical standard 0 and the Delaware legislature's rapid
57. Id.
58. This is not to say that the business judgment rule requires corporate leaders to try to
maximize profits. See infra notes 73, 83, and accompanying test.
59. See generallr Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expan&ig
Duty of Loialtv. 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1769 (2007). See also Rosenberg, supra note 30 for my
discussion of its implications for corporate social responsibility.
60. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. 858 (Del. 1985).
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response,61 the courts of that state began a long process that
ultimately distilled the fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty
down to a standard under which loyalty is dominant. Essentially, any
breach of the duty of care or good faith is also a breach of the duty of
loyalty.6- When a corporate officer approves a political donation that
involves a blatant self-interested quidpro quo, such an act is plainly a
violation of the duty of loyalty even as it was traditionally understood.
But, according to Hill and McDonnell, the duty of loyalty has
expanded to include a "vast middle ground" that courts often
describe as "good faith., 63 The standard of good faith applies, they
argue, to situations in which structural bias is at work or in which the
directors act with "suspect motivation." 64 It is hard to think of an
action that is more influenced by structural bias and more potentially
tainted by suspect motivation than a decision by a corporation to
donate to a super PAC. Given the negative implications of so much
campaign spending by corporations, courts ought to be able to use the
good faith standard to apply to any "strained claim" that a corporate
political donation is business related even where no quid pro quo is
evident.
In the Wrigley case, the defendant argued that his decision not to
install lights, though risky, had a rational and legitimate business
purpose-to create goodwill in the community. Further, as one
commentator has queried, "Wrigley appears to have preferred the
neighborhood's interests to those of shareholders .. . [but] what
selfish interests was he advancing?" 6 That is to say that Wrigley's
decision was not disloyal and therefore not actionable as a breach of
fiduciary duty even though it was placing the interests of the
neighborhood over those of shareholders. Nonetheless, it could be
plausibly argued under Delaware's standard that Wrigley's decision
was made in bad faith because what he was really doing was placing
his own interests (his personal aesthetic belief that baseball is a day
61. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009). For a more in-depth discussion of this
history, see Hill & McDonnell, supra note 59.
62. Given the confusion over the definition of good faith during its prominence in Delaware
law, this is plainly a positive development.
63. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 59, at 1791.
64. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 59, at 1796.
65. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 123 (2d ed. 2009).
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game) over the interests of the corporation. Further, the bad faith at
the core of at least some corporate political spending is much more
blatant than that possibly displayed by Mr. Wrigley.
A. POLITICAL SPENDING IS NOT THE KIND OF ACTION THAT THE
BusINEss JUDGMENT RULE WAS DESIGNED TO PROTECT
A key justification of the business judgment rule is that if the
directors are denied broad discretion to make business decisions, they
will not take the kind of inspired risks that separate the great
innovative and successful companies from the also-rans and soon-to-
be-bankrupt. But this should not be used to allow political spending
where it cannot really be regarded as a business decision at all. As an
example, a corporation might make a donation to a super PAC, not in
order to offer support to a political agenda that will directly benefit
the company but as an exercise of goodwill. Under the conventional
thinking, such a donation might be considered similar to a
corporation's decision to fund a free concert in a public park or to
donate to a food pantry, especially where it appears that the super
PAC's agenda is unrelated to the corporation's business.66 But a
closer look at pure so-called goodwill political giving suggests that it
differs from other decisions based on community outreach or CSR.
In many instances, it is hardly credible to argue that giving to a
super PAC promotes goodwill in the broader sense the way
traditional charity does. Far from it. Corporate political donations,
especially since Citizens United, are divisive in a number of obvious
ways. First, nobody, not even the corporations themselves, believes
that this kind of spending is non-partisan. Biased and controversial
spending by corporations is precisely the kind of action that the First
Amendment (as interpreted by the Citizens United majority67) is
meant to protect. The right to freedom of speech that the Supreme
66. If it is directly related to the corporation's business, for example if an oil company gives
to a super PAC that opposes environmental regulation, then it should be protected like any
other business decision.
67. Indeed, the majority opinion in Citizens United acknowledges that much corporate
political spending will go towards speech that "was enabled by economic transactions with
persons or entities who disagree with the speaker's ideas." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 351.
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Court went so far in protecting is not worth very much if it cannot be
used to express highly partisan opinions. A big donation by a
corporation to an unrelated controversial political cause is not likely
to create goodwill in the community and should not be seen as serving
a legitimate business purpose.68 Second, where there is no obvious
business purpose for the corporate outlay, it will have an immediate
taint of disloyalty to both stakeholders and the larger community. If it
is not plainly designed to further a corporate purpose (again like
ensuring the passage of friendly legislation), then whom does it
benefit'? The perception will likely be that it benefits the people who
made the decision in the first place: the corporate managers and
directors. Third (and worse), a decision to give to a super PAC might
lead to the perception of a quid pro quo. Why would a powerful
corporate officer offer other people's money to the benefit of a
political cause if he did not expect something in return'? Ironically, it
appears that corporate political spending is the most pernicious when
it masquerades as CSR and not when it simply represents an overt
attempt to influence regulation to benefit the corporation itself at the
expense of the public good.
If a court takes into account the difference between real goodwill
spending and non-business related political donations, it will do no
harm to the discretion corporate leaders have in making the kind of
actual business decisions that help companies to succeed. The
business judgment rule allows goodwill and CSR-motivated decision
making because allowing such activity gives the directors the
discretion they need to pursue profits on behalf of the corporation.
That goal would not be inhibited if courts were to review corporate
political spending that does not arise from an obvious business
purpose.69 Nor would such review deviate from the existing law that
68. To be sure, many political donations that are related to a company's business will be
controversial as well and will likely result in bad will in the community. Such donations should
be protected because it is well within the discretion of corporate leaders to decide whether the
negative response to the donation from the public will be outweighed by the possibly favorable
treatment the corporation will receive from government regulators or through legislation
promoted by friendly elected officials.
69. In his dissent in Citizens United, Justice Stevens acknowledges the crucial point that
corporate political spending that benefits only the decision-makers themselves is a breach of
fiduciary duty: "... their fiduciary duties generally prohibit them from using corporate funds
for personal ends." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 467.
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allows shareholders to sue directors for other kinds of blatantly self-
interested and bad faith conduct. All that is required is for courts to
acknowledge what they see in front of them: corporate political
spending that has no purpose but the enrichment of the decision-
makers themselves. Such an acknowledgment would do little to
inhibit the kind of risk-taking that the business judgment rule is
meant to promote.
A number of the proponents of corporations' rights to make
political contributions argue that such actions should receive strong
protections because they are designed to increase firm value. For
example, Roger Coffin writes: "Corporate political spending, when
undertaken by boards of directors properly discharging their fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty and its associated element of good faith, should
be directed at maximizing the long-term value of the firm, and thus be
in alignment with shareholders' economic interests."70 The problem is
that the business judgment rule protects political giving even when it
is not designed to maximize shareholder value or create goodwill in
the community.71 Because so much corporate political spending is
justified simply as a legal act of goodwill or charity, it avoids the
possibility of a judicial inquiry into its legitimacy, even though it bears
little apparent relation to the creation of shareholder value.
Advocates like Coffin want to have it both ways: they justify political
spending as maximizing shareholder value but they want the
discretion to do it even when it bears no relation whatsoever to
increasing profits and, indeed, is likely to stray outside the protection
of the business judgment rule.f'
B. TuE DIVERSIFICATION ARGUMENT
70. Coffin, supra note 23, at 105.
71. Again, this is not to say that courts should review all decisions that are not designed to
increase firm value. Rather, they should review only corporate political spending that is dressed
up as charity or goodwill and is not presented as an attempt to influence legislation or regulation
in the corporation's interest.
72. Coffin states the rule that corporations may ignore shareholder value as long as their
actions have a "nexus to the long term best interests of the corporation." Coffin, supra note 23,
at 125. Of course, it is virtually impossible to think of a political donation for which an argument
could not be made that such a nexus exists.
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It may well be true, as an empirical matter, that corporate profits
are maximized over a range of investments by the business judgment
rule and that a diversified investor would therefore prefer that
directors have the broad discretion that it provides7 3 although it might
result in an occasional misuse of funds. Nonetheless, this is surely
problematic from the point of view of a stockholder who purchases
shares in an individual corporation. Even if we view the purchase of
shares as a contract of sorts between the shareholder and the
corporation, it does not seem implicit that the shareholder is
authorizing the directors and managers to make decisions based on
the understanding that the shareholder approves of certain risky
behavior because, after all, he probably owns shares in lots of other
companies and if they all make risky, speculative decisions, that will
likely maximize the value of the investor's entire portfolio.74
The assumption that this implicit understanding exists becomes
even more problematic when the action taken by the corporation is
not really speculative risk in pursuit of profit but rather, the exercise
of the corporation's constitutional right to express its views through
political spending. When a corporation pays for a political
advertisement, money that could be used for some other purpose is
instead being used to express an opinion that may or may not
maximize profits and that may or may not reflect the opinion of its
shareholders. When such speech arises from the corporation's
exercise of goodwill or charity, rather than a pure profit-motive, its
utility exists only as pure political expression.75 Assuming that
shareholders have diversified portfolios (as we must to justify a broad
interpretation of the business judgment rule) they likely own shares in
a variety of corporations that express a diversity of political views, all
of which taken together cannot possibly make a coherent statement
of value in the proverbial marketplace of ideas.76 While it makes
73. This view is best expressed by Chancellor Allen in Gagliardt See supra note 50. See
also Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 221-24 for my discussion of "The Primacy of Risk-Taking" in
business judgment rule jurisprudence.
74. Gagliari, 683 A.2d at 1052
75. See infra notes 13, 19, 32 and accompanying text for a discussion of why it cannot really
be goodwill in the traditional sense.
76. Further, not only do most stockholders own shares in numerous corporations, they also
frequently buy and sell their shares either as individual investors or through the institutions that
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sense to diversify risky decisions aimed at profit, it makes no sense
whatsoever to force shareholders to pay for political speech that will,
when taken together, simply reflect the conflicting opinions of the
decision-makers who choose to engage in that speech. Under Citizens
United, corporations have a First Amendment right to engage in free
speech, but allowing it as an exercise of the corporation's goodwill
simply produces more speech at great expense that provides no
expressive value to the shareholders who indirectly pay for it.
The Supreme Court recently reinforced this point regarding a
corporation's exercise of a different right with roots in the First
Amendment: the free exercise of religion. In Hobby Lobby, the Court
discounted the possibility of a publicly-held corporation having a
right to the free exercise of religion, stating, "the idea that unrelated
shareholders -including institutional investors with their own set of
stakeholders -would agree to run a corporation under the same
religious beliefs seems improbable."77 Surely the diversity of political
opinions among shareholders of a publicly traded corporation is no
less great than the diversity of their religious beliefs and practices.
The majority in Hobby Lobby suggests that it is unlikely that the
shareholders of a publicly traded corporation could agree on a
religious issue such as whether to close a business on the Sabbath.7"
And the majority rightly indicates that such a dispute ought to be
resolved using the appropriate procedures under state corporate
law.7 9 But it is clear that the majority would not regard the action that
the corporation chooses to take as an "'exercise of religion' that
should be protected under law. Rather, it would simply be a
disagree[ment] about the conduct of business . . . relating to
religion"80 not unlike a disagreement regarding any other matter that
is only indirectly related to the creation of profits. Similarly, when a
corporation makes a goodwill donation to a political cause that does
not have an obvious business purpose, its value both as goodwill and
manage the shares they own in mutual funds. See Coffin, supra note 23, at 153. Shareholders
may well simultaneously or consecutively own shares in corporations that have diametrically
opposed interests in the political arena.
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as speech is nil. It likely creates discord (because of the divisiveness of
partisan politics) and cannot possibly be of value as speech because of
the diversity of the opinions of the shareholders of the corporation
itself. If a publicly held corporation cannot engage in the practice of
religion, it cannot really engage in political speech unless that speech
is motivated solely by a desire to increase profits for that specific
corporation. Further, since a key justification for the business
judgment rule's breadth relies on the assumption that shareholders
hold diversified portfolios, it should not apply to corporate political
donations masquerading as goodwill because the resulting speech has
no expressive value.
C. CAN WE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CORPORATE ACTIONS AND
CORPORATE SPEECH'?
Citizens United established that corporations have the right to
free speech more or less like the rest of us. As such, the decision can
be viewed as one in a long line of cases that have made the United
States perhaps the greatest bastion of free speech in the world. When
a corporation chooses to engage in political expression through the
donation of funds, it is exercising a fundamental right that cannot be
abridged by the government. Further, as long as the decision has met
the standard applied to acts of charity and goodwill under corporate
law, it cannot be called into question by the shareholders through a
derivative lawsuit. In contrast, when a corporation engages in its
everyday business (say, drilling for oil) it is exercising a right that can
be abridged by government regulation. For example, a federal, state,
or local legislature might prevent a corporation from drilling in an
area teeming with endangered species by passing a law deliberately
designed to prohibit that specific activity in that specific place. Such a
prohibition (if properly enacted) does not threaten a constitutional
right of the corporation or its shareholders because the Supreme
Court has not found that the Constitution protects any such right. If
directors were to authorize now-illegal drilling, they would be liable
on two counts: to the regulators for violating the law; and to the
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shareholders for breaching their fiduciary duties. 81
Drilling for oil and donating money to a super PAC can both be
actions motivated solely by a desire to maximize profits for the
shareholders. A decision to drill for oil might fall short of the business
judgment rule's protections if it were not made on an informed basis
(say, a decision to drill in a place where the corporation had no
information indicating a likelihood of finding oil or because it is
illegal to drill there). Further, it might lose the rule's protection if it
were based on self-interest, for example if the corporation agrees to
pay fees to the landowner, a nephew of the chairman of the board of
directors, although the commercial prospects of the project were not
promising. But given the broad protections provided for speech that
might be motivated by goodwill (even if it is in fact self-interested),
shareholders can almost never call into question a corporation's
decision to donate to a super PAC. Corporate speech therefore seems
to enjoy a kind of double protection-it cannot be banned or
regulated by the government (because it is constitutionally protected)
and it cannot lose business judgment rule protection because of
courts' long tradition of refusing to evaluate actions that might be
considered attempts to create goodwill. 82
Unlike with other disloyal activity, there can be no "fairness test"
for a self-interested political donation. If a corporate director votes to
award a contract to his nephew's construction firm, a court might find
disloyalty where the nephew's firm did not give the corporation a fair
deal. Even with evidence of obvious disloyalty, a court will allow the
deal if the price appears fair given the market for the good or service
provided. But when a corporation donates to a super PAC on the
basis of a director's self-interest, an aggrieved shareholder could not
conceivably argue that the corporation did not receive a fair deal in
return. 83 This leaves shareholders in the position of being powerless to
81. Again, when corporate directors authorize illegal conduct (even if the conduct is profit
motivated and in fact profit maximizing), it is almost always viewed as a breach of fiduciary
duty. See Rosenberg, supra note 30. Of course, the goal of much corporate political spending is
to help the businesses write the laws that keep their harmful activities legal. Increasing the
ability of corporations to do this is the most insidious effect of the decision in Citizens United.
Allowing officers to spend corporate funds in their own interest is a close second.
82. Kahn, supra note 35, at 609.
83. Ribstein seemed to believe that market forces are sufficient to prevent directors and
Winter 2015
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
ever call into question directors' decisions to engage in political
speech, even when it is based on self-interest and not the interests of
the corporation and its shareholders and when its value as goodwill is
dubious.
In order to correct the problem, courts simply need to recognize
the inherent disloyalty or bad faith of much corporate political
spending. The business judgment rule gives business leaders a great
deal of discretion to expend corporate funds in a variety of ways
because profit is maximized when courts refrain from second-guessing
such decisions. That discretion extends to corporations that funnel
money to charitable recipients as an exercise of goodwill even if the
act does not appear to be related to increasing corporate profits. But
almost all corporate political spending can really only be one of two
things: (1) an effort to increase profits for the corporation by
influencing government policy; or (2) an act of disloyalty designed to
bring a personal benefit to the decision-makers. If it is the latter, a
court should recognize it as such and allow shareholders to recover
for breach of the duty of loyalty. This will be an important first step in
combating the negative effects of Citizens U nited.
D. RECOGNIZING CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING FOR
WHAT IT Is
Allowing recovery by shareholders for disloyal corporate
political spending will bring a second benefit. In addition to
preventing such self-serving actions that hurt shareholders,
officers from making dubious political donations: "executives would be unlikely to risk board
dismissal for potentially embarrassing or costly political speech whose potential benefits are
long range and speculative. Market discipline helps explain why fiduciary duties focus on clearly
selfish conduct and leave other types of agent misbehavior to the light touch of the business
judgment rule." Ribstein, supra note 6, at 1034-35. The problem is that the courts apply the
business judgment rule with such breadth that it allows almost all corporate political spending
and prevents any inquiry into the disloyalty of such acts. Coffin also argues that fiduciary duties
ought to be sufficient to prevent abuse in corporate political spending: "If existing duties of
care, loyalty and its by-product good faith are not sufficient to prevent a director from ignoring
his or her fiduciary responsibilities to the corporation and its shareholders in the political speech
context, then we cannot rely on those duties to protect corporate and shareholder interests in
any of the other myriad situations in which public companies act." Coffin, supra note 23, at 158.
But Coffin fails to account for the double-protection that political speech enjoys-it can always
be justified as "goodwill," and it can never be banned through legislation.
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corporations, and the democratic process, it will shine more light on
the kind of political spending that corporate law does allow and that
Citizens Ufnited intended to keep fully protected. When a corporation
donates to a super PAC intent on helping reelect a certain United
States senator, that donation should not be viewed as charity or
goodwill. Rather, it is simply a perfectly legal attempt by a business to
influence the way the government regulates it. It may be a very wise
business decision, but it might also have negative consequences to
numerous stakeholders who may respond with actions of their own.
While many critics of Citizens United have little faith in the
usefulness of corporate democracy,84 we ought to retain more
confidence in the ability of voters in public elections to use their
franchise to elect officials whose values, conduct, and policy choices
they support. Once voters understand that there is indeed a direct
correlation between corporate political spending to super PACs and
subsequent legislation that benefits businesses at the public's expense,
the accountability of both corporations and our governmental
institutions will be improved. Further, although it is doubtful that
shareholders will be able to bring about much change through
corporate ballot initiatives, director elections, pressure, or through
selling their shares, their increased awareness of the nature of most
corporate political activity ought to bring about more scrutiny on the
spending itself. Finally, consumers may respond by favoring
corporations who refrain from campaign spending or by avoiding
those companies whose actions they disagree with. All of these effects
may go a long way to countering the "external distortion" created by
Citizens I United
V. CONCLUSION
Under current law, the duty of loyalty reigns supreme among the
fiduciary duties owed by directors to the shareholdersF8' That duty
prohibits, among other things, self-interested transactions that are not
intended to benefit the corporation. Much corporate campaign
84. See supra text accompanying note 23.
85. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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spending seems to meet this definition. 86 Virtually any corporate
campaign spending smacks of the potential for disloyalty in a way that
ordinary business decisions and ordinary acts of charity do not. When
a corporation chooses to drill for oil, the profit-based motivation is
clear and the likelihood of self-interest on the part of the directors is
low. On the other hand, when a corporation donates to a political
campaign, the profit-based motivation is often obscure and the
potential for self-interest by the directors is manifest: they have
unilaterally directed the corporation's money into the hands of
powerful people whose mission is to ensure that other powerful
people achieve elected office or hold on to their seats. Unless the
directors can show a true business purpose for the outlay of funds,
courts should waive the protections of the business judgment rule and
permit the shareholders to sue the directors for breach of the duty of
loyalty. Existing corporate law allows for such an interpretation; this
would go a long way toward limiting the damage of the Citizens
United decision.
86. See Yosifon, supra note 23, at 1229. See also Hill & McDonnell, supra note 59, at 1794-
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